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Abstract
We explore the possible role of interdependence of expectations in
emerging market economies and analyze the crisis transmission mecha-
nism within the pure contagion framework. We consider the cases of
Russia, Turkey, and Brazil, and assess whether the fundamentals of these
countries allowed for the possibility of purecontagion e¤ects from each
other. In particular, we look at Russia - Turkey and Brazil - Russia
pairs in year 1997 to see whether Brazilian and the Turkish economies
exhibited vulnarability to pure contagion before the 1998 Russian crisis
We also repeat the same exercise with the most recent 1999 data. The
rationale for choosing these pairings is the huge volume of (luggage) trade
between geographical neighbors Russia and Turkey, and the similar ex-
port structures of Russia and Brazil (predominantly raw materials) which
are continents apart. Our results clearly indicate vulnerability of Brazil-
ian and Turkish economies to high probability of crisis in Russia even in
the face of improving fundamentals. In isolation, Brazilian and Turkish
fundamentals were not weak enough to place them in a sure-crisis situa-
tion. With the incorporation of the Russian link, the multiple equilibria
setting disappeared for both countries, rendering sure-crisis as the single
equilibrium solution.
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Forthcoming in Russian and East European Finance and Trade
1 Introduction
It had been a well established fact for some time that countries could be resorting
to overly restrictive monetary policies while gthing ination in order not to end
up with a depreciating currency which would hinder their disination e¤orts. In
a setting of no policy coordination or coordination failures of that nature, wide
spread recessions become inevitable. Such worries had indeed been behind the
role assigned to the IMF by nations participating in the global system.
The world nancial markets have witnessed increasing turmoil in recent years
and emerging economies have felt the intermittent crises perhaps more than
others. The crisis in global nancial markets that started in East Asia in 1997
subsequently spread to other parts of the world and culminated in Russias de-
fault on its debt in the Summer of 1998. Russias default has led to loss of
international investor condence in the performance of risky markets all around
the world. International capital started to ee the emerging markets, leaving
behind nancial and economic turmoil in emerging market economies and de-
veloped economies alike. The nancial crisis spread to Latin America after the
Russian devaluation and debt restructuring. Brazil was especially a¤ected. The
LTCM, a colossal U.S. hedge fund which had invested heavily in risky emerging
markets, collapsed and had to be rescued by the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank.
In short, international capital markets displayed excessive volatility as well as
susceptibility to contagion of ill e¤ects from one market to the others. Emerg-
ing market economies su¤ered most from this volatility and the concomitant
contagious e¤ects.
The latest turmoil in the Turkish markets in early December 2000 in the
form of a liquidity crisis shook not only the local markets but created consider-
able jitters in the Russia and even in Argentina where IMF support had been
awaited anxiously even prior to the Turkish nancial debacle. The liquidity
crisis in Turkey led to skyrocketing interest rates and fuelled all kinds of rumors
about devaluation, default of government debt, sand in the wheels capital
controls, etc. The stock market in Turkey plunged to year-lows, and soon the
Russian market followed. Fear of contagion became rampant, and IMF acted
with an unprecedented speed and volume of assistance to put an end to tremors.
All these countries need to strengthen their fundamentals drastically, fulll the
long-delayed structural reforms, and become somewhat less vulnerable to the
volatilities in the international markets. Their weaknesses in this respect make
them prone to contagion e¤ects excessively as illustrated by the latest crisis
in Turkey. Following the announcement of the sizeable USD 10.4 billion IMF
package that abruptly reversed the panic mood, the markets in Turkey calmed
down, and so did other emerging markets, at least for the time being. Still, some
market watchers, bankers, and institutions are keen on a possible devaluation,
although for the time being this remains a remote possibility. Nevertheless, the
fragility of equilibiria in the Turkish markets are not only under close monitoring
by the locals, but by other emerging markets as well. Naturally, the same is true
for all emerging markets in the current setting of increasingly uid international
environment.
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The extent and di¤erent forms of contagion among international nancial
markets have been well documented.(Corsetti et al.[7]; Goldstein [11]; Radelet
and Sachs [22]; Sachs et al. [23]; IMF [12]). There is also a growing litera-
ture on understanding the theoretical nature and causes of contagion (Calvo
[1]; Calvo [2]; Chang and Velasco [3], [4]; Krugman [14], [15]). Recent debate
on the need for reshaping the international nancial structure points to reduc-
tion of the extent of nancial contagion as one of the main goals (Fischer [9]).
Dornbusch et al. [8] argue that minimizing nancial contagion would require
action by governments and the private sector in both emerging markets and the
leading industrialized countries, as well as judicial interference when necessary
by multilateral institutions.
An outstanding feature of the crises in 1990s is that the timing of their oc-
currance and their severity seem to be unrelated to the fundamentals of the
countries concerned. For example, the 1994-95 crisis in Mexico started right
after the devaluation of December 1994, which should have corrected the mis-
alignment of the exchange rate and reduced the large current account decit.
Despite this improvement in Mexican fundamentals, there ensued a loss of in-
vestor condence, the exchange rate collapsed, and Mexico found itself on the
verge of default on its foreign debt. Moreover, the crises, once they started in a
particular country, spread to other countries with not particularly strong trade
and capital ow links with the country in which the crisis had started. This
was the case in the contagion of Mexican crisis to Argentina and Brazil, in the
concurrent crises in most East Asian countries in 1997, and in the spread of the
e¤ects of the Russian default in 1998.
These observations have stimulated interest in models which admit multiple
equilibria, i.e. models in which both a no-crisis situation and a sure-crisis situ-
ation can emerge as equilibrium phenomenon, and where jumps between equi-
libria may be initiated by events unrelated to the fundamentals incorporated
in the model (Jeanne [13]; Masson [18], [19]). If such multiple equilibria are
indeed a possibility for a given country, rational investors will recognize the pos-
sibility of jumps, and form their expectations accordingly. Volatility introduced
through dependence on such expectations may lead to investorsexpectations of
a crisis becoming self-fullling. Thus, if events seemingly unrelated to funda-
mentals in a particular country are what steer investorsexpectations, we may
indeed observe contagion of a crisis for no other reason than the degeneration
of investorss expectations on a badequilibrium.
In this paper we adopt a model introduced in Masson [18] to look at the pos-
sible role of interdependence of expectations formed by international investors
regarding the performance of emerging markets. We consider the cases of Rus-
sia, Turkey, and Brazil, and assess whether the fundamentals of these countries
allowed for the possibility of such purecontagion e¤ects from each other. In
particular, we look at Russia - Turkey and Brazil - Russia pairs in year 1997
to see whether Brazilian and the Turkish economies exhibited vulnarability to
pure contagion before the 1998 Russian crisis We also repeat the same exercise
with the most recent 1999 data. The rationale for choosing these pairings is
the huge volume of (luggage) trade between geographical neighbors Russia and
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Turkey, and the similar export structures of Russia and Brazil (predominantly
raw materials) which are continents apart.
Masson [18] proposes a classication of reasons why we might observe con-
temporaneous crises in developing countries. A common cause, such as a change
in the U.S. monetary policy, may a¤ect all developing countries, which Mas-
son calls the monsoonale¤ect. Macroeconomic linkages, such as trade links
among developing countries, may lead to spreading of crises among them, which
may be termed as spillovere¤ects. Finally, we have the case of pureconta-
gion, where the increased likelihood of crisis in one country precipitates another
country into crisis with no actual crisis having taken place in the former coun-
try.1
In a model that allows for possibility of contagion through a number of
channels, we concentrate on the case of pure contagion whereby a crisis may
arise in an emerging market with sound fundamentals solely because of an
impending crisis in another emerging market.
In Section 2 we briey overview the model that allows us to consider the
issues mentioned above. Empirical applications follow in Section 3. Section 4
includes a brief discussion and conclusion regarding the role multilateral insti-
tutions like IMF might play by developing policies and tools that will bestow
credibility on coordinated commitment e¤orts by emerging economies.
2 The Model
We consider a simple balance of payments model with two emerging market
countries.2 Let D1t and D
2
t denote the external debt stock of Country 1 and 2
in peiod t, respectively. The (risk-neutral) international investors demand to
be compensated by an amount equal to the risk-free (foreign) rate r plus the
expected rate of devaluation. Let it stand for the probability of a devaluation
occurring in Country i in period t, and i stand for the extent of expected
devaluation in Country i. It follows that
r = r + it
i (1)
will be the expected rate of return demanded by international investors in period
t when lending to Country i. We assume that the risk-free (foreign) interest rate
r, which we take as given and constant, summarizes the external environment
for the emerging economies.
The source of uncertainty in the model is shocks to the trade balance. We let
TBit stand for the trade balance of Country i in period t. Up to an event that
triggers a crisis, the authorities in each country nance changes in the current
account balance with reserves. Let Rit stand for the reserves in Country i in
period t. If shocks to the trade balance are large enough so that Rit falls below
1See Masson [19] for an application of this model. For a review of papers that consider
other forms of pure contagion, see Masson [20].
2We closely follow the model developed by Masson [18]. For further technical details of
the model, see Jeanne [13].
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a critical level R
i
, then a devaluation follows.3 It follows that the change in
reserves from period t to t+ 1 is given by
Rit+1  Rit = TBit+1  
 
r + it
i

Dit: (2)
A crises occurs in period t+ 1 if
Rit+1 < R
i
: (3)
This implies that the probability, as of period t, of a crisis in period t + 1 will
be
it = Prt
h
TBit+1  
 
r + it
i

Dit +R
i
t  R
i
< 0
i
: (4)
Let
bit  TBit   rDit 1 +Rit 1  R
i
; (5)
and it  iDit. This allows us to express (4) above as
it = Prt

bit+1 < 
i
t
i
t

(6)
A it that solves this equation gives us the probability of a crisis that will be
self-fullling. That is to say, if the expected probability of a crisis is it > 0,
this will lead to a deterioration of the fundamentals of the economy so that
the probability that the reserves will fall below the critical reserve level R
i
;
hence, the probability of a crisis will indeed become it. For example, if 
i
t 
1, this means that investors are expecting a crisis almost for sure, and these
expectations will turn out to be fullled. The interest rate premium, it
i
t, that
will be commensurate with such high expectation of crisis will be so high that it
will indeed force the reserves to fall below the critical level and, hence, trigger
the crisis.
Let
	it  Et

bit+1

; (7)
where Et [] is the expectation operator calculated at time t. Note that 	it
serves as a composite fundamental that incorporates the expected trade balance,
existing external debt and reserves, the risk free foreign interest rate r, and
the critical reserve level R
i
. The innovation in variable bit, which here is the
consequence of the shocks to the trade balance, is equal to "it = b
i
t  	it 1. We
assume that "it is normally distributed with mean zero and variance
 
i
2
. We
can express it in terms of the cumulative distribution function of the innovation
in bit as
it = Fi

it
i
t  	it

(8)
3As Masson [18] indicates, the model applies to risk of default on liabilities in foreign
currency as well. By inating the value in domestic currency of foreign debt, a devaluation
makes repayment more di¢ cult and hence increases default probability. On the other hand,
a default on foreign debt will most likely lead to a fall in capital inows, leaving devaluation
to increase net exports as the only option to restore current account balance. Hence, there is
a considerable link between risk of devaluation and risk of default.
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where Fi [] is the c.d.f. of a normal distribution with variance
 
i
2
.
Equation (8) succinctly expresses the formation of expectations of a crisis in
Country i by investors. Both the left-hand-side (LHS) and the right hand side
(RHS) of (8) depend positively on it, which implies that there may be multiple
solutions.4 The necessary condition for the existence of multiple equilibria is
given by
it =
itp
2i
> 1: (9)
Recalling that it  iDit, this condition highlights the importance of the size
of foreign debt and the extent of devaluation (or default) in the case of a crisis.
If the ratio of their product to the standard deviation of shocks to the current
account balance exceeds a certain level, the economy will be in the region of
multiple equilibria. The implication of this is that an economy can jump from a
low crisis expectation equilibrium to high crisis expectation equilibrium on mere
speculation even if there is no change in the fundamentals. Since expectations
are self-fullling, worsening expectations lead to deterioration of fundamentals
and crisis becomes an actuality.
In addition to condition (9), which is only a necessary condition, multiple
equilibria will arise if 	it, the level of fundamentals of the economy in period t+1
as perceived in period t, falls within a certain range. Note that the solutions of
(8) are obtained at the intersection of the 450 line from the origin, the LHS of
(8), with the c.d.f. given on the RHS of (8) (see, for example, any of the Figures
1 - 6 below). These two curves will be tangent to each other at two points. Let
!it 
p
2 ln it, and dene the following two critical states for the fundamentals:
	it = 
i
tF1
  !it + i!it and 	it = itF1  !it   i!it. Then multiple equilibria
are possible following range for 	it:
	it < 	
i
t < 	
i
t: (10)
If the expected fundamentals are very good, i.e. if 	it  	
i
t, the c.d.f. on the
RHS of (8) falls to the right and there will be only one intersection with the 450
line, giving a low equilibrium value for it (a low probability of crisis). If, on the
other hand, fundamentals are poor, i.e. if 	it  	it, the c.d.f. on the RHS of (8)
falls to the left and there will again only be one intersection with the 450 line,
giving this time a high equilibrium value for it (a high probability of crisis). In
between, multiple equilibria can occur.
The existence of multiple equilibria brings out the possibility of a country
jumping from a goodexpectations equilibrium, where crisis is not likely, to a
badexpectations equilibrium, where crisis becomes very likely, when there is
a crisis in another emerging market economy. If international investorsexpec-
tations regarding emerging economies are correlated enough, the result will be
contagion of crisis from one emerging economy to the other even if there has
been no change in the fundamentals of the latter.
4See Jeanne [13] for details.
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Looking at (7) and (10), we observe that vulnerability to pure contagion
is greater when there is a large debt, when reserves are low, when the trade
balance is in decit, and the risk free foreign interest rate is high.. In addition,
the extent of expected devaluation, i.e. i can also be a signicant determinant
of equilibrium expectations.
2.1 Contagion Links among Emerging Economies
There may be a number of di¤erent channels linking one emerging economy
with another emerging economy. We assume here that the trade balances of
Country i and Country j will be linked because of trade competition between
these two countries. Let the equations for the trade balance and real exchange
rate (RER) be given respectively by
TBit = T
i   iRERit + "it; (11)
and
RERit = S
i
t   wiSjt   uiSt; (12)
whereSit is the nominal exchange rate (expressed as the dollar price of the do-
mestic currency) in Country i, St is the exchange rate (assumed xed) of the rest
of the world, and wi and ui are related weights. The assessment of probability
of devaluation, hence that of crisis, for Country i now depends on the possibil-
ity of devaluation, hence crisis, in Country j (i 6= j). That is, the probability
that Rit < R
i
will be di¤erent depending on whether Country j is expected to
devalue (have a crisis) and how much it will devalue. Therefore, the probability
of crisis in Country i becomes
it =

1  jt

Fi
h
it
i
t   e	iti+ jtFi hitit   e	it + iwiji ; i 6= j; (13)
where e	it = Et hebit+1i, with ebit+1 = TBit   rDit + Rit   Ri, incorporates the
interlinkages between Country i and Country j. In our empirical assessments
below, we concentrate exclusively on the impact of the extent of expected deval-
uation in each country. This is the purecontagion case, where crises spread
solely because of a worsening of expectations in another emerging economy
without necessarily a worsening of fundamentals in the country in question.
Alternatively, one could consider the impact of a change in r, the parameter
describing the external world, on the probability of crises in emerging markets.
This is the so called mansoonale¤ect. The direct spillovers of changes in the
real exchange rates of interlinked emerging economies would be another type of
contagion. In this paper, we deal exclusively with the case of pure contagion.
3 Empirical Results
We utilize the model discussed in the previous section to analyze in retrospect
the crisis potential in Turkey, Russia, and Brazil; separately for each without
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any pure contagion e¤ects and subject to pure contagion for Russia - Turkey
and Brazil - Russia pairs.
The years selected for analysis are 1997 and 1999. The rationale for the
selection of 1997 is to gain an insight within our framework, if possible, for the
infamous Russian crisis in 1998, which put both Turkey and Brazil in predica-
ments of similar nature. Brazil virtually had to oat its currency in the after-
math of the crisis, and Turkey su¤ered a huge capital outow while trying to
protect its currency. The year 1999 was chosen for the practical reason of being
the most recent data period available.
Below we present the summary data that was utilized in calculations for
each country.5 The values for variables are expressed as per cent of GDP. To
obtain an estimate of the variance of the shocks to the trade balance 2, an
AR(1) process was estimated for the Trade Balance/GDP ratio. The standard
error of the estimate of this regression was utilized as the estimate of .6
Country Date Dit R
i
t R
i
t T
i
t
Brazil 1997 0.280 0.063 0.036 -0.008
( = 0:0158) 1999 0.450 0.062 0.029 -0.002
Russia 1997 0.340 0.030 0.048 0.039
( = 0:0572) 1999 0.872 0.046 0.052 0.182
Turkey 1997 0.470 0.097 0.061 -0.08
( = 0:0162) 1999 0.558 0.126 0.067 -0.76
The value for , the parameter reecting the extent of expected devaluation
is chosen as 0.25 for all years and all countries. Considering that interventions
in the form of a devaluation would mostly be grossdevaluations with a huge
initial loss in the value of the currency to be followed by appropriate appre-
ciation, expectation of a 25% devaluation seems to be a modest assumption.
Higher values for  would accentuate all the conclusions to be derived below.
The annual 1-year U.S. T-bill rates (secondary market) were used as the risk
free foreign rate r.7
We adopt here a denition of R
i
which takes into account the maturity
structure of the external debt. We take the position that half of the Short Term
External Debt/ GDP ratio is a reasonable benchmark value for R
i
.8 This we
5The sources for data used are IFS, IIF documents, and authorsown calculations.
6Estimation periods for Brazil, Russia, and Turkey are 1980-1999, 1990-1999, and 1991-
1999, respectively.
7The annual 1-year U.S. T-bill rates are 5.32% and 4.81% for years 1997 and 1999, respec-
tively (source: http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm).
8Cole and Kehoe [6] considers short-term debt to be the key variable behind vulnerability
to self-fullling attacks.
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nd to be more plausible than chosing R
i
as zero9 , implying that no devaluation
will be undertaken until the reserves are fully exhausted. With our notion of the
critical reserve level, it becomes possible to distinguish between crisis exposures
of two almost identical economies with the same magnitude of reserves and
external debt, who di¤er only in the maturity structure of the external debt.
Our choice would make a country with a shorter debt maturity much more
crisis prone than one that has a longer term maturity structure, whereas R
i
= 0
measure would fail to accomplish this.
3.1 Countries in Isolation with No Pure Contagion E¤ects
3.1.1 Russia
Figure 1 reveals that the fundamentals in Russia enforce a single bad equilibrium
with a very high probability of crisis (  0:97). Indeed, when we compute
(9) using Russian data from above, we get Russia1997 = 0:67 < 1, indicating that
the Russian economy is not even in the region of multiple equlibria. The main
culprit behind this conclusion is the very high variance of innovations to the
Russian trade balance.
The situation in 1999 (see Figure 2) is not much di¤erent as the economy is
still stuck with a single bad equilibrium ( = 1, i.e. sure crisisequilibrium).
Fundamentals have meanwhile deteriorated, with the External Debt/GDP ratio
surging to 87.2% from 38.4% in 1997 and the level of actual reserves are still
less than the threshold level R
Russia
1999 .
3.1.2 Turkey
As Figure 3 depicts, the Turkish economy is in multiple equilibrium region in
1997. However, a slight deterioration in the fundamentals could eliminate the
good equilibrium and transform the scene into one of single bad equilibrium.
Moreover, the knife-edge property of the good equilibrium hints at the possibility
of jumping from the good equilibrium to the bad one with no change in the
fundamentals but increased likelihood of crisis in another emerging market.
The situation in 1999 is still one of multiple equilibrium (see Figure 4), but
the knife-edge property of the good equilibrium eased somewhat due to the sub-
stantial excess of actual reserves over the threshold level R
Turkey
1999 . Technically,
the curve representing the RHS of (8) has shifted to the right as a result of the
improvement in fundamentals.
3.1.3 Brazil
The situation in Brazil is very similar to that in Turkey in the sense that the
economy is in the region of multiple equilibria in both periods, and there is
improvement, although denetely less severe than in the Turkish case, in the
fundamentals from 1997 to 1999 (see Figures 5 and 6). Note that the fall in the
9See, for example, Krugman [14] and Masson [18].
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foreign interest rate r from 1997 to 1999 also contributed to the improvement
in the fundamentals. The di¤erence between the two countries lies in the knife-
edge property of the good equilibrium which is more pronounced in the case of
Brazil. This renders Brazil much more vulnerable to both spillover and pure
contagion e¤ects from other emerging markets.
3.2 Contagion of Crisis from Russia to Turkey and Brazil
Russia - Turkey and Russia - Brazil pairings in 1997 clearly display the vul-
narability of Turkish and Brazilian economies to the pure contagion threat orig-
inating from Russia. The inclusion of Russia into the Turkish and Brazilian
pictures as the source of contagion eliminates the multiple equilibria phenom-
enon in these countries, and both end up with a bad equilibrium in which the
probability of crisis is pushed to unity. The fundamentals in Russia seem to be
so poor that the incorporation of neither country into the Russian picture can
have a favorable impact in the form of creating multiple equilibria possibility
for Russia (see Figures 7 and 9).10
Although both Brazil and Turkey registered improvement in their funda-
mentals from 1997 to 1999, as indicated above in Sections 3.1.2 and 3.1.3, the
Russian pure contagion link is enough to more than o¤set these improvements
and put the two countries in a state of sure crisis in 1999 (see Figures 8 and 10).
The fundamentals in Russia remain poor, and improved fundamentals of Brazil
and Turkey fail to provide any positive feedback for the Russian economy.
4 Conclusions
The IMF emerged from the bitter experiences of competitive devaluations during
the Inter-War period. The issue was perceived as an international collective
action problem which individual countries, acting on their own, could not solve
or solve poorly. Coordinated action was deemed welfare improving. In the early
1970s, the costs of maintaining xed exchange rates turned out to be greater
than the benets, and the Bretton Woods system collapsed. In the early 1980s,
the IMF was perceived as the institution to prevent the coordination problem
that could arise between countries ghting o¤ ination. In order not to end
up as the party with the depreciating currency, countries opted for excessively
restrictive monetary policies which in turn led to widespreas recessions. The
track record of the IMF on that front was not impressive, and since then the
IMF has not had a coherent mission. Suggestions for a new mission to the
IMF include the role of an international bankruptcy court and enforcement of
accurate disclosure of nancial and economic country data (Chari and Kehoe
[5]).
The current paper aims to illustrate the relevance of pure contagion e¤ects
for emerging market economies, and diagnoses as a by-product a collective action
10 In solving for (13) we took w = 0:1 in all cases considered. The simulations showed
that results were very robust to changes in both directions.
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problem regarding pure contagion that may imply a role for the IMF. Our
results clearly indicate vulnerability of Brazilian and Turkish economies to high
probability of crisis in Russia even in the face of improving fundamentals. In
isolation, Brazilian and Turkish fundamentals were not weak enough to place
them in a sure-crisis situation. With the incorporation of the Russian link, the
multiple equilibria setting disappeared for both countries, rendering sure-crisis
as the single equilibrium solution.
Very crudely, behind contagion lies instability of expectations. Can some
rules, backed with incentives provided by an international agency such as the
IMF reduce this instability? The idea can be characterized as sanding the
expectationsorsand in the triggeras opposed to sand in the wheelswhich
envisage restrictions on international capital ows. If the system provides indi-
vidual countries incentives to behave in a predetermined manner in case of crisis,
expectations concerning the outcome of the crisis may be imploding, rather than
exploding. This, in turn reduces the chances of crisis and contagion.
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Figure 1: Russia 1997
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Figure 2: Russia 1999
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Figure 3: Turkey 1997
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Figure 4: Turkey 1999
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Figure 5: Brazil 1997
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Figure 6: Brazil 1999
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Figure 7: Russia - Turkey 1997
Figure 8: Russia - Turkey 1999
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Figure 9: Brazil - Russia 1997
Figure 10: Brazil - Russia 1999
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